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STOLEN ART AND THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE: AN UNSETTLED PAST AND AN
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Natalie Rogozinsky*
I. INTRODUCTION

The act of state doctrine, specifically in as it applies to works of
art taken from individuals, galleries, and private museums through
national expropriation laws, is not an area of the law that is well
settled. This is due to changing U.S. foreign policy, inconsistent
applications of the act of state doctrine, preclusion of the doctrine
by various statutes of limitations, and the often-tangled factual
web surrounding stolen works of art. As such, this paper seeks to
provide an elucidating overview of the development and use of the
doctrine, and to speculate as to its value in future stolen art cases.
The act of state doctrine stands for the proposition that United
States courts will not question the legality of an official act taken
by a foreign nation within its own territory.' The doctrine focuses
on two concerns: "respecting the sovereignty of foreign states" and
maintaining "the separation of powers in administering foreign
affairs of the United States."2 Unlike the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity, a court may apply the act of state doctrine
even if a foreign government is not a party to the case.3 In recent
years, to expropriations of property due to various nationalization
laws.4 Contested property has often been business holdings,
religious objects, and works of art. Many current cases concerning
expropriated artworks stem from two major 2 0 1h Century conflicts:
the rise of the Nazi Regime in Germany and the Russian
Revolution. Cases dealing with art taken during the Holocaust
* J.D. 2015 DePaul University College of Law.

See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
2

Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1289 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

3 Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV.

325, 345 (1986).
4 PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CURTURAL HERITAGE AND THE LAW

575 (3rd ed.

2012).
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have achieved more public recognition in the past 20 years, and
will be the focus of the final portion of this paper.
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: HISTORY

Under the common law act of state doctrine, United States
courts abstain from adjudicating claims where the relief sought
requires the court to declare an official act of a foreign government
taken within its own territory as invalid.' Although the doctrine is
relatively longstanding in Federal jurisprudence, its basis and
policy implications have not been fully developed by courts and
have been inconsistently applied by courts.6 Most scholars agree
that the doctrine "should be invoked to protect the separation of
powers by allowing the Executive to control foreign policy, as well
as protecting foreign states' interest in avoiding judicial review of
their acts in U.S. courts."7 It is unclear if act of state is a doctrine of
judicial abstention, political question, choice of law, or issue
preclusion.8 Justice Scalia shed some light on this issue in W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,
International,stating that the doctrine is a principle of decision,
and that "act of state issues only arise when a court must decidethat is, when the outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of
official action by a foreign sovereign." 9 In Cassirerv. Kingdom of
Spain, Judge 0 writingfor the Ninth Circuit stated "Act of State is
a substantive defense on the merits that is distinct from
immunity. "10

It is important to note that act of state does not deprive a court of
jurisdiction or the right to hear a case, rather it precludes a court
5 Breana Frankel, Oy Vey! The Bernstein Exception: Rethinking the Doctrine
in

the Wake of Constitutional Abuses, Corporate Malfeasance and the 'War on
Terror', 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 67, 67 (2009-2010).
6 Bazyler, supra note 4, at 327.
7 Lucy Dunn Schwallie, Acts of Theft and Concealment:Arguments Against the
Application of the Act of State Doctrine in Cases of Nazi-Looted Art, 11 UCLA
J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 281, 286 (2006).
8 Id. at 287.

9 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l., 493
U.S. 400, 406 (1990).
'0 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1045 n.12 (9th Cir., 2010).
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from assessing the validity of the foreign government action.
Effectively, a court determines the merits of the case under the
assumption that the act was valid." This effectively makes it
extremely difficult for a claimant to win a replevin action if the
court must necessarily assume that the expropriating acts of a
foreign sovereign were valid. The doctrine's varied uses and
interpretations throughout history further demonstrates this point.
A. Early Cases
The act of state doctrine is derived from English common law as
a corollary to sovereign immunity: "Sovereign immunity protected
the sovereign government against lawsuit, while the act of state
doctrine extended the same immunity to individual officials acting
on behalf of their government."' 2 The Supreme Court first
recognized the doctrine in 1812 in The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon.3 It dealt with an American schooner that was captured
by Napoleon and re-commissioned as a French warship.' 4 The ship
later sailed into Philadelphia where its previous owners filed a suit
to seize the ship, claiming the French had taken it illegally. 5 The
Supreme Court, in dismissing the action, stated that, "all
exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."' 6 The
ship, being the property of a foreign nation with whom the United
States had peaceful diplomatic relations, was held as exempt from
jurisdiction. '7
States
United
11Schwallie, supra note 7, at 288.
Bazyler, supra note 3, at 331.
Bazyler, supra note 3, at 330.
14 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116, 117 (1812).
15 id.
16 Id. at 136.
at 147. This case is an example of how early jurisprudence conflated
17 Id.
12

13

foreign sovereign immunity, the doctrine that a foreign nation cannot be sued in
U.S. court, with the act of state doctrine. Although it was true here that foreign
sovereign immunity protected France from suit, the real cause of action was
derived from France's official act of capturing the Exchange from its original

owners, an early example of an act of state issue.
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In Underhill v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court established act of
state as a doctrine independent from sovereign immunity.'8 The
Court looked at actions taken by Hernandez, a Venezuelan
commander, who led the anti-administration party during the 1892
Venezuelan Revolution.' 9 Eventually, Hernandez's party was
formally recognized by the United States as the legitimate
government of Venezuela.20 Underhill, a citizen of the United
States who constructed waterworks for the city of Bolivar under a
government contract, applied for a passport to leave Venezuela.2 '
Although Underhill eventually was given a passport and allowed
to leave, he brought an action in U.S. court to recover damages for
detention, confinement to his home, and assaults by Hernandez's
soldiers.2 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's holding that
"the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of
Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication
in the courts of another government. 23 In the first clear declaration
of the act of state doctrine, the Court stated, "Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. 24 The Court gave deference to the State
Department's official interpretation of the Venezuelan civil war
and the fact that it had chosen to recognize Hernandez's
government as legitimate. 25 Disturbingly, the Court noted the
reason for Underhill's detention was of no concern in that "it was
not sufficient" that "the defendant was actuated by malice" even
though the evidence at trial indicated that the purpose was to
"coerce the plaintiff to operate his waterworks and his repair
works" for the benefit of the revolutionary forces.2 6
18 Bazyler, supra note 3 at 331.
20

Underhillv. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 250 (1987).
id.

21

id.

22

id
Id

19

23

24

Id. at 252.

25

Hernandez, 168 U.S. at 253.

26

Id. at 254.
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In Oeten v. Central Leather Co., the Supreme Court further
expanded the doctrine to exempt not only acts taken by foreign
officials (as in Underhill), but also to acts of takings by foreign
governments generally. The case involved two consignments of
leather hides, which were taken by the revolutionary government
of Mexico, sold in Mexico to a Texas corporation, and imported
into the United States.27 The United States had recognized the
revolutionary government of Carranza as the official government
of Mexico in 1917.28 The original owner of the Mexican hides, in
suing for replevin, argued that the Mexican revolutionary
government had violated the Hague Convention of 1907,
constituting a treaty between the United States and Mexico, in
.seizing the hides.2 9 The court rejected this argument, stating that,
"Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the legitimate Mexican
government when dealing with a Mexican citizen, and [...] such
action is not subject to re-examination and modification by the
courts of this country."3
B. The Russian Revolution
The Russian Revolution looms large in act of state doctrine
jurisprudence, having been the focus of several suits involving
works of art. Although the conflict was much more complicated
than could be explained here, a brief summary will suffice as the
background to several stolen art cases. Russia's 1914 entrance into
World War 131 proved disastrous for the http://www.bbc.co.uk/histo
ry/worldwars/wwone/easternfront_01.shtml country, as war,
famine and disease killed over 9 million people in the next few
years.3" In February of 1917, riots forced Czar Nicholas 1I to
abdicate power to a provisional government of socialists and
27
21

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1918).
Id. at 301.

29 id.
30 Id. at 303.
31 Jonathan

Smele, War andRevolution in Russia 1914-1921, BBC NEWS (last
updated March 10, 2011), www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/eastern_
front_01.shtml.
PBS, World War I Casualty and Death Tables, PBS.COM, (last visited
March 19, 2014), www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html.
32
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moderate liberals.33 This government aimed for a resolution to the
war, but due to the powerful influence of the Bolsheviks and
Vladimir Lenin, lasted only a matter of months.3 4 On October 2425, 1917, the Bolsheviks staged a coup d'6tat and took control of
the government.3 5 The Bolshevik government signed the treaty of
Brest-Litvosk in March of 1918 to end the war with Germany.36
After defeating a challenge to power by a more conservative antiBolshevik party, the Bolsheviks under Lenin established the
U.S.S.R. in 1922. 37
Lawsuits regarding expropriations of personal property from this
period are largely centered on artistic and religious works. The
Bolsheviks and Lenin were critical of organized religion and
private wealth.3 8 Several Russian decrees worked to expropriate
personal property after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.3 9
United States v. Pink was the first case to address the act of state
doctrine relative to an official agreement between the United
States and a foreign nation, and was also the first to address the
application of the act of state to Russian expropriations. In Pink, a
New York branch of a Russian Insurance company sought to
recover assets that had been nationalized by the Bolshevik
revolutionary government." By Russian decree in 1918-1919, all
debts and rights of shareholders in First Russian Insurance Co. had
been discharged or cancelled, including those held by United

33 Smele, supra note 3 1.
34 Smele, supra note 31.
35 Russian Revolution,

HISTORY,

(last

visited

March

19,

2014),

http://www.history.com/topics/russian-revolution.
36 Smele, supra note 31.
37 HISTORY,

supra note 35.

38 17 Encyclopedia Judaica, Russia, 531-553 (2007).
39 See Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.C.N.Y. 1976).

Decree No. 111 of the Council of People's Commissars published on March 5,
1921 nationalized all movable property of citizens who had fled the Soviet
Union, and Decree No. 245 of March 8, 1923, promulgated by the All Russian
Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars,
nationalized property housed in state museums. It is unclear whether all
property in state museums was actually owned by the government, or whether
some may have been on loan or previously illegally expropriated.
40 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 203 (1942).
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States citizens. 1 Pursuant to a decree from the Supreme Court of
New York, the Superintendent of Insurance, Pink, seized the assets
of the bank, and proceeded to pay off all domestic creditors,
followed by foreign creditors.42 On November 16, 1933, the United
States recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
accepted an assignment of certain pre- nationalization assets to the
United States government under the Litvinov Assignment. 3 The
United States brought suit to recover the remaining assets of First
Russian Insurance Co. from Pink.
The Supreme Court in Pink recognized that the "conduct of
foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the political
departments of the Federal Government."44 The Litvinov
Assignment, representing "an international compact between two
governments", was an exercise of power "not open to judicial
inquiry."45 The Court was especially concerned with preserving the
President's sphere of foreign relations power, stating that the court
would "usurp the executive function if we46held that that decision
was not final and conclusive in the courts.
The Court also saw the act of state doctrine in this case as being
inherent to the Federalist system: "If state law and policies did not
yield before the exercise of the external powers of the United
' The Court,
States, then our foreign policy might be thwarted."47
ultimately recognizing the legitimacy of the Russian decree, held
that after Russia acquired the property of First Russian Insurance,
it legally passed this right to the United States under the Litvinov
Assignment.48 The United States was therefore entitled to the assets
of First Russian Insurance as against the corporation's creditors. 9

41 Id. at
42 id.
41

210-11.

Id. at211.

Id. at 222.
41 Id. at 223.
44

46

Id. at 230.

41 Pink, 315 U.S. 203 at 232.
48

Id. at 234.

49 id.
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C. World War H and the BernsteinLetter
The other major event to come into act of state litigation in the
United States is World War II. Art collection, display, and
propagandistic use was integral to the Nazi ideals." Hitler's first
major public building project was the Haus der Deutschen Kunst,
meant to house the art that the Nazis deemed worthy (mostly art
that propagated Nazi and Aryan ideals)." The Nazi overhaul of the
once-booming German modem art scene included the firing of art
directors and professors, closing of galleries, and unjust "sales" of
Jewish and modem art. 2 The Nazis staged a show of "Degenerate
Art" in 1937, haphazardly displaying modem and Jewish art
confiscated from German museums and galleries, and a few weeks
later commenced a total purge of these works from public German
collections, removing nearly 16,000 works. 3 This massive
collection, which included some of the most important modem
destroyed, and many works
works, was sold, stored, or
were lost forever. 4 These acts are particularly important in the
later discussion of the Gurlitt Collection. The Nazis proceeded to
plunder works from all over Europe, both from private and stateowned collections. Jewish property was especially targeted for
expropriation under the Nuremberg Laws.55 The Einsatzstab des
Reichsleiter Rosenberg, a special unit separate from the German
military, carried out much of the Nazi looting during the war. 6
It is estimated that the Nazis stole 20 percent of all Western Art
in Europe,57 or about three million objects. 8 After the war, Alfred
Rosenberg, the director of the Einsatzstab, was indicted in the

50

LYNN NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA

9

(1994).

5' Id. at 10.
52 [d.

" Id. at 22-23.
14

Id. at 23-25.

55 Schwallie, supra note 7, at 288-89.
56 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 4, at 574.
57 Jennifer Anglim Kreder, State Law Holocaust-EraArt Claims and Federal

Executive Power, 105 NW. U. L. Rev. COLLOQUY 315, 317 (2011).
58 Schwallie, supra note 7, at 282.
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Nuremberg Trials for various crimes, including crimes against

humanity, and sentenced to death. 9
The act of state doctrine poses a major obstacle to the
repatriation of artworks taken by the Nazis during World War 11.
Arguably, the malicious character of the Nazi takings, the fact that
they were often executed outside of Germany, and the fact that the
Nazi regime no longer exists, necessitate exception to the rigid
hands-off rule mandated by act of state. Courts have wrestled with
how to apply act of state to Nazi expropriations, a complicated
moral and legal question compounded by a case in 1954 and the so
called Bernstein exception.
In early cases dealing with Nazi expropriations, the courts were
constrained by the act of state doctrine to uphold the takings." In
Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, a German Jew
brought suit against a German corporation for breach of an
employment contract after he was terminated from his job.6 The
corporation countered that "subsequent to April 7, 1933, the
government of Germany adopted and promulgated certain laws,
decrees, and orders which required persons of non-Aryan descent,
of whom plaintiff is one, to be retired" and that these events, over
which it had no control, terminated the contract.62 The court
refused to adjudicate the case, stating that however objectionable
the court might find the German law, "every sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory. 63
A major turning point in cases dealing with Nazi expropriations
was Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme. The case
dealt with the property of a German corporation, the Arnold
Bernstein Line, which owned a ship, the Gandia.64 Bernstein, a
German Jew, was taken into custody by Nazi officials in 1937 and
59 GERSTENBLITH,
60
61

supra note 4, at 574.

Schwallie, supra note 7, at 289.
Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 14 N.E.2d 798, 799-800

(C.A.N.Y. 1938).
id.
63 Id. at 800 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. at 303).
62

Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 247 (2d
Cir. 1947).
64
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imprisoned in Hamburg, where they forced him to execute
documents transferring his business to a German citizen, Marius
Boeger, without fair and adequate compensation.65 This was part of
the Nazi's program of eliminating non-Aryans from German social
and economic life.66 Bernstein later filed suit in U.S. court for the
return of his vessels, or their value, and damages.67
The Second Circuit cited the long-standing history of the act of
state doctrine, as upheld by the Supreme Court in Underhill and
Oetjen, and refused to pass judgment upon the validity of acts of
officials of Germany.68 Perhaps sensing that such a strict
application of this rule would be unjust, the court also bolstered its
rationale with a different approach to the act of state. It stated that
the real issue was whether the Executive branch "has declared that
the commonly accepted doctrine which we have just mentioned,
does not apply."69 The court first cited a "Declaration" made by the

Allied Powers in 1945, assuming power over Germany and
abolishing all Nazi laws that had provided the basis of Hitler's
regime or discriminated on the basis of race or religion.7 ° It also
noted Sec. 2 of Article 1 of Law 52, the United States legislation in
regards to the defunct Nazi state mandated that "property which
has been the subject of transfer under duress ... is hereby declared
to be equally subject to seizure of possession or title . . . by

Military Government."'" The court concluded that these were
simply preliminary laws by the United States, which were never
fully resolved by a domestic Restitution law.72 The court repeated
that "the only relevant consideration is how far our executive has
indicated any positive intent to relax the doctrine that our courts
shall not entertain actions of the kind at bar."73 Claims for
repatriation, it stated, should be dealt with in a treaty, as they were
"obviously matters of international cognizance and must be left
65 Id.
66 Id.
67
68
69
70

Id. at 247-248.
Id. at 249.
d.

Bernstein, 163 F.2d at 250.

71 Id.
72 Id.
71

Id. at 251.
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wholly within the control of our own Executive."74 Bernstein
alternately argued that the judgment at the Nuremberg Trial, which
recognized as crimes the acts of the Nazi regime, worked to extend
criminal liability to the instant case.7 5 The court responded that
application of this law was reserved for adjudication specifically at
the Nuremberg Trials as part of the final settlement with Germany,
and could not be extended to a New York court.76
In another attempt to gain compensation, Bernstein again filed
suit, seeking damages for the conversion of his stock interest in the
Arnold Bernstein Line.77 This time, the appeal to the Second
Circuit was drastically changed by an intervention of the executive
branch. The State Department issued Press Release No. 296 on
April 27, 1949 from Legal Advisor Jack Tate, relieving "American
courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials. 78 This so called
"Bernstein Letter" stated the United States government's
"opposition to forcible acts of dispossession of a discriminatory
and confiscatory nature practiced by the Germans on the countries
or peoples subject to their controls" and stated that "it is this
Government's policy to undo the forced transfers."79 In view of
this clear mandate from the executive branch, for whose benefit
the act of state doctrine was developed, the Second Circuit
reversed its earlier decision "by striking out all restraints based on
the inability of the court to pass on the acts of officials in Germany
during the period in question."8
The legacy and meaning of the Bernstein exception, both to the
act of state doctrine and to Nazi era claims in general, have been
contested and remain unsettled in courts.8 ' In Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, six justices seemed to reject it, stating, "we do
not now pass on the Bernstein exception, but even if it were
74 id.

" Id. at 252.
76 Id.

Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-AmerikaanscheStoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375, 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
77

78 id.
79 id.

80 Id.
81

Frankel, supra note 5, at 68.
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deemed valid, its suggested extension is unwarranted.8' 2 In Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First City NationalBank, the Supreme Court
was split as to whether the Bernstein exception did and should ever
apply, and six of the nine justices thought the Bernstein exception
should be rejected.8 3 The Court noted that the Bernstein exception

had been applied in other cases, on a case-by-case basis, especially
when dealing with issues of international law.84 Justice Powell's

concurrence stated that courts had a duty to hear cases like this
unless it would interfere with foreign relations conducted by the
executive branch, but rejected the Bernstein exception's violation
of separation of powers.85 The dissent also refused to recognize the
Bernstein exception, and stated that the act of state doctrine should
be applied to all cases like First National City Bank, due to the
nature of these types of issues as "political questions."86 The
argument for maintaining the separation of powers has arisen as
the most compelling reason for rejecting the Bernstein exception.
The Supreme Court has maintained this separation through other
judicial doctrines, the political question doctrine being the prime
example.
In Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, however, the
Court relied heavily on an executive opinion issued to the court,

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436 (1964). This case,
explained in more detail later in this paper, dealt with nationalization of sugar
holdings by the Cuban government.
83 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S.
759, 760, 787-88
(1972). FirstNat'l City Bank dealt with excess collateral that First National City
Bank had pledged to the Bank of Cuba to secure a loan. After the Cuban
government nationalized and seized all of First National City's holdings in
Cuba, First National City sold the collateral securing the loan and kept the sale
profits. The Bank of Cuba sued for the excess money realized from the
sale above the value of the debt, and First National City asserted it was entitled
to the money as damages stemming from the nationalization of its property in
Cuba. As will be explained later, the Second Circuit and Supreme Court found
that the Hickenlooper Amendment, which would have precluded the use of act
of state, and therefore also of the Bernstein exception, did not apply to the facts
of the case.
82

84
85
86

id.
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 787-88.
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analogizing Bernstein to the case at bar. 7 Justice Rehnquist's
plurality opinion in Dunhill seemed to support the application of
the exception, as he noted that when the Executive urges that the
act of state doctrine not apply, one of the main rationales for the
doctrine's existence (protection of this branch of government) is
eliminated.8 Additionally, in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the
Court hinted at act of state and the Bernstein exception, even
though the case was decided on FSIA grounds: "Should the State
Department choose to express its opinion on the implications of
exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners in connection
with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be entitled to
deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a
particular question of foreign policy."8 9 Scholars also have noted
that since the act of state doctrine deals with the ability of the
court to adjudicate a claim, courts should not rely on executive
pronouncements, as this "threatens to undermine the integrity and
independence of the judiciary"9 and violates the separation of
powers.9
Due to this disagreement in the Bernstein exception's
application, lower courts have tended to defer unequivocally to the
State Department's assessment of the cases before them.92 This not
only confuses the position of the doctrine, but also produces
inconsistent results across the circuits. Critics and proponents of
87 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 709

(1976). This case involved the Cuban government's nationalization of business
assets of five cigar manufacturers. The former owners of the cigar plants
brought actions against international importers for the purchase price of cigars
that had been shipped to the importers from the seized cigar plants.
88 Frankel, supra note 6, at 77.
89 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004). This case was
mainly concerned with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which the
Supreme Court held could apply retroactively. The litigation involved a claim
for the famous Gustav Klimt painting, Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer, which
had been seized from its original owner by the Nazis, and held in an Austrian
state museum.
90 Kathleen Karelis, Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: Reconciling Justice
and Diplomacy on a Case-by-Case basis, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1169, 1200
(1989).
91

Frankel, supra note 5, at 69.

92 Id. at 97.
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the Bernstein exception readily await a crowning Supreme Court
pronouncement when its application can be settled.
D. Sabbatinoand The Cuban Revolution
The most widely accepted version of the act of state doctrine is
derived from a case dealing with the nationalization of American
assets after the Cuban Revolution. 3 Fulgencia Batista took power
in Cuba in 1952 after a military coup and cancellation of the 1952
elections.9 4 While the Cuban people were impoverished, the Batista
government actively promoted United States business in Cuba.9 5 In
1952, Fidel Castro, leading a group of dissidents, started to protest
and fight the Batista government.9 6 After Castro seized power on
January 1, 1959, his regime began to expropriate United States
property in Cuba.97 The United States broke diplomatic ties in 1961
due in part to these expropriations.98
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino dealt with one of the
trade embargos the United States imposed on Cuba after the 1959
Revolution. The United States Congress amended the Sugar Act of
1948 to reduce the sugar quota for Cuba, and the Cuban
government responded by nationalizing and expropriating the
property of several sugar companies that were controlled by
United States citizens.99 An American company had proceeds from
sugar shipments, which had been sold before the nationalization of
the original Cuban corporation."' Banco Nacional de Cuba was the
financial agent of the Cuban government, and brought a suit to
93 Bazyler, supra note 3, at 334-35.
94 THE GUARDIAN, From the Archive, 11 March 1952: Batista's
Revolution,

THE GUARDIAN (March 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/the
guardian/2013/mar/ 1/cuba-batista-fifth-revolution- 1952.
95 J.A. Sierra, Batista, HISTORY OF CUBA (last visited

March 19, 2014),
http://historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/batist.htm.
96 Library of Congress Federal Research Division,
Country Profile: Cuba,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 3 (Sept. 27, 2006), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/
profiles/Cuba.pdf.
97
id.

98 Id.
99 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1964).
100

Id. at 401.
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recover the proceeds, which it believed belonged to the Cuban
government due to the nationalization law.' The District Court
found that the Cuban expropriation decree violated international
law in that it was retaliatory, it discriminated against American
nationals, and it failed to provide adequate compensation.0 2
The Supreme Court, reversing the District Court and Court
of Appeals, held that United States courts could not inquire into
the validity of a decree by the Cuban government, even though the
stock in the nationalized Cuban corporation had been owned
principally by United States citizens.'0 3 In a partial reversal of
earlier doctrine, the court stated that the act of state doctrine was
not compelled by any notion of sovereign authority or international
law.0 4 Justice Harlan, writing the opinion, went so far as to state
that, "the text of the Constitution does not require the act of state
doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the
capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state," before he
conceded that nonetheless, the doctrine did have "constitutional
underpinnings."'i' This referred to the relationship between the

executive and judicial branches, and the separation of powers
regarding foreign affairs, as well as the Federalist system, which,
he feared, would not be left intact if courts were free to apply their
own discretion to issues of Federal, national importance.0 6 The
most important contribution of the Sabbatino decision was its
promulgation of factors used to determine when to apply the act of
state doctrine. Justice Harlan stated that,

"

. .

.

the (Judicial

Branch) will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant
and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of
a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking
violates customary international law."'0 7
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406-07.
103 Id. at 439.
' '

102

105
i6

Id. at 421.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 423-24.

107

Id. at 428.

104
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E. The HickenlooperAmendment
In 1964, in response to the Sabbatino decision, Congress passed
the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2),
which bars the use of the act of state doctrine for expropriations of
property that occurred after January 1, 1959."08 The Amendment
contains two exceptions: first, in any case where the act of the
foreign state was not contrary to law and was secured by an
irrevocable letter of credit, and second, where the President
requested application of the act of state doctrine in a letter filed
with the court." 9 However, courts have continued to adhere to the
requirements set forth in Sabbatino, rather than this rule in the
Hickenlooper Amendment, therefore leaving the influence of both
the Amendment and the Bernstein exception unclear. Courts have
generally interpreted the Hickenlooper Amendment narrowly,
constraining its application to property that has a questionable title
and is located in the United States." 0
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, the
District court found that the Hickenlooper Amendment had
overruled Sabbatino,"' while the Second Circuit found that in
some cases, Sabbatino still barred judicial intervention into all acts
of foreign states.' 12 The Second Circuit analyzed both the original
policy reasons surrounding the enactment of the Hickenlooper
Amendment, and the House hearings regarding its application.1 13
Given that the amendment was "designed to be invoked by
American firms in order to afford them 'a day in court' presumably monetary recovery", the court held that there was no
basis for First National City, which had already offset its claims, to
be allowed to bring suit under the Hickenlooper Amendment." 4
108 GERSTENBLITH,

supra note 4 at 577.

"' 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2).
110 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 4 at 577.
111 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. FirstNat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1007
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2nd Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1019
(1971).
112 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 400-402
(2nd Cir. 1970), vacated,400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
113

id.

114 id,
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The Supreme Court upheld this narrow reading stating, "In
arriving at this conclusion, the [Second Circuit] found inapplicable
the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, 78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C. s 2370(e)(2). I agree
with my colleagues in leaving that determination undisturbed.""' 5
The Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine did not bar
the claim of First National City for assets expropriated by Banco
Nacional of Cuba, and focused on a letter from the Legal Advisor
of the Department of State directing the court that it had discretion
not to apply the doctrine." 6 Applying the Bernstein exception, the
Court therefore relied on this statement by the executive branch,
not the Hickenlooper Amendment, to bar the use of the act of state
doctrine.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN ART CASES

Though there have been many cases dealing with expropriations
of artworks by foreign governments, the limited scope of this
paper only leaves room to discuss the few most pertinent to the act
of state doctrine as it relates to art. The application of act of state
in these cases gives some understanding to how a court may apply
the doctrine in a future case, specifically involving something like
the Gurlitt Collection, discussed in the third part of this paper.
A. Menzel v. List and the "Treaty Exception "
Menzel v. List was the first litigated case to involve art stolen
during World War II."7 Menzel claimed to be the rightful owner of
a painting, Le Paysan a L'Echelle by Marc Chagall, which was
discovered in 1962 in the possession of Albert List." 8 Menzel and
her husband had fled Brussels in 1941 before the occupation of the
Nazi army, and had left the painting in their apartment. 19 The
painting was taken by the Einsatzstab der Dienststellen des
115 FirstNat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 780 (1972).
6 Id. at 764.
".. GERSTENBLITH,

supra note 4, at 565.

118 Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (Sup. 1966).
19 Id. at 806.
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Reichsleiters Rosenberg, the organization authorized by Hitler to
seize cultural heritage. 2 ' After it was taken in for "safekeeping",
the painting was lost from 1941 to 1955 until List purchased it at
the Perls Galleries in New York. 2 ' Menzel demanded the return of
the painting within the applicable statute of limitations and was
denied by List.'22
The court held that the act of state doctrine did not apply in this
case, due to the fact that the taking at bar failed to satisfy all four
factors of the test set out in Sabbatino.'23 The court first looked into
the relationship between the Einsatzstab and the German
government, concluding that the operations of the Einsatzstab were
financed by the National Socialist Party, not by the German
government.'24 Secondly, the site of the expropriation was not
within the territory of the foreign government since it occurred in
Belgium, not in Germany. 2 5 Even if it could be argued that
Belgium was occupied by Germany, and was therefore under
German law, the court negated this argument and found that the
government of Belgium technically continued to exist during
occupation.'2 6 Thirdly, the Third Reich was no longer a recognized
government at the time of trial.'27 Lastly, the court held that the
seizure of the painting was in violation of treaty obligations to the
United States.' 28 Specifically, the court examined the 1899 Hague
Convention and the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War and Land.'29
This last basis for denying act of state, that the taking was in
violation of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, involves the
so called "treaty exception" to the act of state, derived from the
phrase "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous

120

Id

121 Id. at

806, 808.

123

Id. at 807.
Id. at 813.

124

Id. at 815.

122

125 id.
126
127
128

Id. at 816.
Id.
Id. at 817.

129 id.
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agreement" in the Sabbatino decision. 3 ° The so called "treaty
exception" is not well developed, and was not the main basis for
denial of act of state in Menzel, but may nonetheless be helpful in
future cases dealing with Nazi-era claims. After Menzel and
Sabbatino, discussion of the "treaty exception" did not arise again
3 ' There, an
until International Group v. Islamic Republic of Irani."
American Corporation with assets in Iranian Insurance companies
filed suit regarding the 1979 "Law of Nationalization of Insurance
Companies" by which the Iranian government seized control of all
the corporation's holdings.'32 However, at the time of
nationalization, there was a Treaty of Amity between the United
States and Iran.'3 3 In a short paragraph about the applicability of
the act of state doctrine, the court stated that "the act of state
doctrine does not preclude judicial review where, as here, there is a
relevant, unambiguous treaty setting forth agreed principles of
international law applicable to the situation at hand."' 34
In a later case, Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional
Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, dealing with a Treaty of
Amity between the United States and Ethiopia, the Sixth Circuit
found "that this is a controlling legal standard in the area of
international law."' 35 There, the court allowed adjudication on the
merits of a claim of expropriation by the Ethiopian government. It
cautioned that "it should be apparent that the greater the degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it," therefore potentially leaving room
for certain treaties with less "consensus" to be less influential in
overriding act of state. This would seem a dangerous notion, that
the judiciary is equipped to pass judgment on the influence of
certain treaties or areas of international law. Indeed, this is
130 Sabbatino, 367 U.S. at 428.
131
132

Schwallie, supra note 7 at 294.
American Intern. Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522,

523 (D.C.D.C., 1980).
13 Id. at 524.
14 Id. at 525.
135Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist
Ethiopia,729 F.2d 422, 425-26 (6th Cir. 1984).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2019

19

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2

20

DEPAULJ ART, TECH. &IPLAW

[Vol.XXVI: 1

precisely the kind of judicial inquiry that the act of state seeks to
avoid.
This was the situation of the Fifth Circuit case Callejo v.
Bancomer, where two Americans claimed that the Mexican
exchange control regulations of 1982, which significantly
decreased the strength of their Mexican investments, violated the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund to
which Mexico was a party.' 3 6 The Fifth Circuit stated:

Although Sabbatino refers merely to "treat[ies] or other
unambiguous agreements," treaties are not all of a piece; they
come in different sizes and shapes, ranging from the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air ("Warsaw Convention") [ ...]to the United
Nations Charter [ .... ] For this reason, the treaty exception was

not stated in Sabbatino as "an inflexible and all-encompassing
rule," [ .. . . ] instead, its application depends on pragmatic

considerations, including both the clarity of the relevant principles
of international law and the potential implications of a decision on
our foreign policy."3

This statement brings in the next phrase from Sabbatino, namely
that the act of state doctrine will be applied "even if the complaint
' The
alleges that the taking violates customary international law."138
Fifth Circuit in Callejo recognized the ambiguity involved in
reconciling these two phrases: the first allows a broad exception
while the second seems to negate or circumscribe it. Callejo stands
for the proposition that not all treaties or agreements may be
leniently applied to strike down the application of the act of state
doctrine, without the addition of some "customary international
law" violation. It is unclear what the status of this "customary
international law" must be to pass muster. While the Supreme
Court of New York in Menzel gave deference to two international
conventions, the initial Second Circuit decision in Bernstein did
not give deference to either a declaration promulgated by the
United States, nor the judgments of the Nuremberg trials.'39
136

Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1985).

137 Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1118.

138Sabbatino, 367 U.S. at 428.
139

See Bernstein, 163 F.2d at 250-52.
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B. The Russian Art Cases

The Stroganoff-Scherbatofflitigation dealt with ramifications of
expropriations during the Russian Revolution. Count Alexander
Sergevitch Stroganoff was the original owner of two works, the
painting Portraitof Antoine Treist, Bishop of Ghent and a bust of
Diderot. 4 ° Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, a descendent and heir of Count
Stroganoff, brought suit against the present owners, three private
collectors and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, to recover the
works.' 4 ' Both the portrait and the bust had been sold by order of
the Trade Consulate of the U.S.S.R. in 1931 at the Lepke Kunst
Auctions Hause in Berlin and had made their way through various
owners to New York and London.' 42 The defendants argued that
the
even if Stroganoff- Scherbatoff could prove ownership 4of
3
works through lineage, the act of state doctrine barred relief.
The court traced the evolution of the act of state doctrine
through Underhill, Oetjen, and Sabbatino, giving deference to the
multi-factor test set out in Sabbatino.' It recognized that the
works were clearly appropriated by the Soviet Government
pursuant to either the 1921 or 1923 decrees, which effectively
45
nationalized much of the moveable property in the country.
However, Stroganoff-Scherbatoff argued that the illegal taking
actually occurred in Berlin at the Lepke Auction, rather than in
Russia, making the act of state doctrine inapplicable as a
defense.' 46
Remarkably, the court in Stroganoff-Scherbatoff looked to an
English decision, Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz 47 , of the British
Court of Appeal.' 4 8 The Princess Paley Olga case had nearly
analogous facts and the British court held, "Our Government has
recognized the present Russian Government as the de jure
140

Stroganoff-Scherbatoffv. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18, 19 (S.D.N.Y., 1976).

142

Id. at 20.

141 Id.

143 Id.
'44

Id. at 21.

145 id.
146 id.

14
148

(1929) 1 K.B. 718.
Stroganoff-Scherbatoff,420 F. Supp. at 22.
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Government of Russia, and our Courts are bound to give effect to
the laws and acts of that Government so far as they relate to
property within that jurisdiction when it was affected by those
laws and acts."' 4 9 The District Court in Stroganoff- Scherbatoff
applied similar logic, noting that the Soviet Government was
recognized by the United States in 1933 and that the taking had
been carried out under official direction from the government, both
factors leading it to hold that act of state precluded the suit. 5 ' The
court differentiated this case from Menzel, where the taking had
been carried out by the Nazi party, not a foreign state, and had
been outside the territorial boundaries of the expropriating
nation.'
Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation, involved a
collection of religious books, manuscripts, and other documents
compiled by the spiritual leaders of Chabad, a Jewish spiritual
movement started in Russia in the 1 8th Century.'52 The Russian
Bolshevik government had seized a portion of the collection (the
"Library") during the 1917 Revolution and stored it in the Lenin
Library, and then the Russian State Library.'53 A second portion of
the collection (the "Archive") was brought to Poland in 1933 by
one of the Chabad leaders after he was exiled from the Soviet
Union.'54 The Archive was taken first by the Germans, then by the
Soviets, and was brought to the Russian State Military Archive.'55
After Agudas Chasidei Chabad became incorporated in New York
in 1940, the organization tried unsuccessfully for 70 years to
recover both parts of the collection and then filed suit against the
56
Russian Federation. 1
One of Russia's claims in the litigation was the act of state
defense. 5 7 The D.C. Court of Appeals denied the defense as to the
149 Id. (quoting PrincessPaley Olga, 1 K.B. at 725).
151 Id. at 22.
151

152

id
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of

U.S. v. Russian Federation,528 F.3d 934, 938

(C.A.D.C. Cir. 2008).
153
154

155
156
157

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 939.
id.
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Archive, but accepted it as grounds for dismissal for the Library. 58
The court first addressed the Archive, holding that Russia had not
met its burden." It noted that one of the requirements for the
application of act of state was that the expropriation took place in
the expropriator's sovereign territory. 6 ° Russia attempted to argue
that because the Archive was seized in German territory that was
occupied by the Soviet Union, this fulfilled the requirement.'61
However, after examining the records surrounding the
expropriation, the Appellate court concluded that the Archive was
actually seized in Poland, not Germany.'62 The court did not go
into any further depth on this basis for denial of act of state, nor
did it address Russia's theory that occupation of a territory
constitutes sovereignty enough to fulfill the requirement (a
position clearly refuted in Menzel).
As to the Library, the court noted that it could not give the
requested relief to Chabad without having to invalidate the 19171925 events that occurred within Russia.'63 It cited several passages
from Sabbatino, which it said "might militate against the
application of the doctrine here."' 64 Most notably, the court looked
to a passage that suggested that the relevant considerations
underlying the act of state doctrine might shift "where the taking
government has been succeeded by a radically different regime. 165
Here, however, because the Russian government in this case was
actively defending its right to keep the Library, the court stated
that the "application of Sabbatino's invitation to flexibility would
here embroil the court in a seemingly rather political evaluation of
the character of the regime change itself-in comparison, for
and other aspects of Germany's
example, to de-Nazification
166
postwar history."'

58

Id. at 950.

9 Id. at
160Id. at

953.
952.

161 id.
162 id.
163

Id. at 953.

164id
165 Id.
166 Id.
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Chabad attempted to counter that because the takings were
religiously motivated, and not for a bona fide governmental
purpose, they were violations ofjus cogens norms, making it more
acceptable for the Appellate court to render a decision.'6 7 The court
rejected this argument for two reasons: first, because it would
require the court to develop a 'hierarchy' of violations of
international law in order to apply the doctrine, and second,
because the Sabbatino court had already refused to apply an
exception to act of state simply for violations of international
law.16 However, the court ultimately vacated the judgment in
regards to the Library and remanded.169 On remand, the District
Court did not specifically address the act of state doctrine,
focusing instead on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as the
basis for denial of Russian claims. 7 ° Although the District Court
ordered the return of the manuscripts, Russia has yet to return
them, and has been issued sanctions for contempt of court in the
amount of $50,000 per day until it complies with the July 30, 2010
order.171
Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art is one of the most
recent cases to apply the act of state doctrine to a case dealing with
stolen art during the Russian Revolution. Konowaloff sued the
Metropolitan Museum of Art for the return of Paul Cezanne's
Portrait of Madame Cezanne, to which he claimed rightful
ownership.' Konowaloff was the great grandson and sole heir of
71 3
Ivan Morozov, a Russian merchant and modern art collector.
Pursuant to a December 19, 1918 decree by the Bolshevik
government, Morozov's art collection was deemed to be state
property of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, and
167

ld

168

Id at 955.

169 Id.
170

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Federation, 729 F. Supp. 2d

141, 144 (D.D.C., 2010). Russia refused to participate any further in the
litigation after the Appellate decision. Because it could not therefore again raise
the act of state defense, the District Court here did not address it.
171

id

Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2011 WL 4430856, No. 10 Civ.
9126, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011), aff'd 702 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2012).
172

173

id.
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his works, including the Cezanne, were taken from his possession
without compensation.'74 Morozov and his family fled to France,
where he died in 1921.175

Through one of its trustees, Stephen C. Clark, the Metropolitan
Museum of Art came into possession of the Cezanne work. Clark
was active in the art trade following the Russian Revolution, and
was alleged to have purchased the painting in secret through the
Knoedler Gallery in New York.176 The work hung in Clark's

residence until his death in 1960, at which time it was bequeathed
to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 177 Due to the Morozov

exile, lack of financial resources, and difficulties
family's
traveling to Russia, Konowaloff was prohibited for decades from
discovering the true ownership of the painting.' However, after
the opening of Russia under Perestroika and the death of his father
in 2002, Konowaloff had the opportunity to start cataloguing his
family's possessions and learned about the Cezanne.79
In its decision barring Konowaloffs claim due to the act of state
doctrine, the Southern District of New York extensively cited
previous jurisprudence and policy considerations, including
Underhill and Sabbatino. The court granted much deference to
previous decisions, namely Pink and Stroganoff- Scherbatoff that
"have consistently held Bolshevik/Soviet nationalization decrees
to be official acts accepted as valid for the purpose of invoking the
act of state doctrine."' 8 ° The court struck down Konowaloffs first
argument in attempting to distinguish acts of the Soviet state from
acts of Politburo, the executive arm of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, which had engaged in the illegal sale of the work. 8 '
It stated that because it was precluded by precedent from
questioning the acts of the Soviet state in confiscating the work, it
declined to decide whether Konowaloff had ownership interest in
the painting and therefore the legality of the sale abroad was of no
174 id.

175Id.
176

Id. at *2.

177 Id.

178

Id. at *3.

Id. at *4.
180 Id. at *5.
179

181Id. at

*3.
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consequence. 82 The court recognized that it was "being asked to
"decide the legality of [an] official act of a sovereign"- precisely
'
the sort of inquiry precluded by the act of state doctrine. "183
Konowaloff's second argument is especially pertinent for a
discussion of Holocaust-era looted art. He argued that due to the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 199 1, it was not a "presently extant
and recognized regime" as to mandate application of the act of
state doctrine. 8 ' The court stated that this reasoning would only
apply where the previous government "has been completely
rejected by the community of nations ...or where the subsequent
government has actively repudiated the acts of the former
' This was
regime."185
not the only distinction between the Nazi and
Soviet governments, as in Stroganoff-Scherbatoff the court noted
the difference between an official act of the government, as in
Russia, and an act taken by an organ of a political party, as in the
Nazi regime. 86 The District Court in Konowaloff seemingly
realizing that this was an unsatisfying basis, ultimately rejected
Konowaloff's first argument on the grounds that is was not
qualified "in the absence of an authoritative lead from the political
branches, to entail just the implications for foreign affairs that the
doctrine is designed to avert."'87
The Stroganoff-Scherbatoff Chabad, and Konowaloff holdings
therefore narrowly avoided conflict with each other.'88 Although all
182
183

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.

184 id.
185

id.

Id. at *7.It is notable that in Konowaloff Chabad, and StroganoffScherbatoff,the court refused to decide whether the Russian Federation was the
successor in interest to the Soviet Union. This failure was most apparent in
Konowaloff when the plaintiff brought forth evidence of Russia's investigations
into the illegal Soviet sales of 1928-1933. The court there stated, "Neither fact
leads to the conclusion that the current Russian government has repudiated the
ubiquitous nationalization of property under the Communist Regime." Id.
at *7.
187 Id. (quoting Chabad,528 F.3d at 954).
188Konowaloff was involved in another suit with Yale University
involving a
similar set of facts to the Metropolitan Museum of Art case. The District Court
decision resulted in no new judicial pronouncements on the act of state, and
186

closely paralleled the previous case. See Yale U. v. Konowaloff, 2014 WL
1116965, No. 3:09CV466 (D. Conn. March 20, 2014).
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three suits involved takings of art by the Russian Government
during the Revolution, the factual differences work to differentiate
the holdings of the cases. Three things can be noted with respect to
takings by the Russian Government during the revolution: first,
takings from private Russian citizens within Russia seem to be
protected under the doctrine; second, takings from Russian
occupied territory during WWII (possibly not including Germany)
seem not to be protected under the doctrine; and third, takings that
were motivated by religious persecution may be exempted from
act of state protection." 9 This last point is unclear, as the Chabad
court alluded that evidence of selective persecution, while it would
not necessarily bear on the ultimate ruling, would be helpful in
determining the validity of Chabad's jus cogens argument. 9 ' The
Konowaloff litigation skirted the issue entirely. However, both
courts did defer to the Sabbatino court's statement that the act of a
foreign state would not be challenged even if it violated customary
international law. It is therefore unclear what weight is given to
evidence of systematic and targeted religious persecution, if held
to be in violation of both customary international law and treaties.
C. De Csepel Case
Another recent art case dealing with act of state was de Csepel v.
Republic of Hungary, ruled on by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in 2013.' Baron Mor Lipot Herzog was a Jewish art
collector in Hungary who amassed one of the largest collections in
Europe, known as the "Herzog Collection."' 9 2 After the Baron's
death in 1934, his three children inherited the collection, and it
remained in Hungary until March 1944 when German troops were
sent into the country.'93 The Hungarian government, collaborating
with the Nazis, confiscated the Herzog Collection, some of which
189

See Stroganoff-Scherbatoffv. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y., 1976);

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Federation, 729 F. Supp. 2d 141
(D.D.C., 2010).
190 Agudas Chasidei Chabad,729 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
191De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591 (C.A.D.C., 2013).
192

Id. at 594.

193 id.
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was transported to Germany and some of which was housed in the

Hungarian Museum of Fine Arts.'94 After the end of the war, the
Herzog family tried for decades to locate their stolen artworks,
some of which were located and returned to them through lawsuits
in Hungary.'9 5 De Csepel, a United States citizen and heir to Baron
Herzog, filed in U.S. District court against the Republic of
Hungary, as well as various Hungarian museums, primarily

asserting a claim for bailment.196
The Republic of Hungary had several arguments in its defense,

197
one of which was that the claim was barred under act of state.

The court noted language from McKesson Corp v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, stating that act of state could only be applied to

official conduct that was undertaken by a sovereign, not by a
private individual acting in a commercial capacity (even if the
individual was a government).'98 The court in de Csepel concluded
that because this case dealt with breaches of bailment agreements

(commercial acts), as opposed to sovereign acts, the doctrine did
not apply.' 99
'9' Id. at 595.
195 Id. at 596.
196 Id. De Csepel alleged that Hungary, a national university, and several
museums had breached a bailment
agreement, whereby they had agreed to hold possession, but not legal title, to
the artworks, and to return them upon demand. The defendants had refused to
return the works, thus allowing de Csepel to raise a claim.
197

Id. at 604.

198 Id. (quoting McKesson Corp v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066,

1073 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). McKesson was one of several cases that have dealt with
the act of state doctrine in relation to commercial activity. The court in that case
held that the act of state doctrine did not shield Iran from liability after it
expropriated an American company's interest in dairy stock. The court found
that Iran did not issue any formal governmental edict or law, but took control of
the corporation's board of directors and used its majority shareholder position to
freeze out the corporation's board members and stop paying dividends, all acts
of private individuals within a corporation.
'99 de Csepel, 714 F.3d at 604. The court additionally addressed an issue in
connection with the "expropriation exception" to the FSIA, which harkens back
to the Russian art cases. The "expropriation exception" abrogates sovereign
immunity in any case where "rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue." 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3). While the court
recognized that takings by the Hungarian government from its own citizens
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IV.

GURLITT COLLECTIONS

On February 28, 2012, German Customs officials discovered a
treasure trove of 1,406 artworks in the Munich flat of Cornelius
Gurlitt, the son of German art dealer Hildebrand Gurlitt.20 The
stash included works by many renowned artists including Marc,
Durer, Kirchner, and Kokoschka, totaling about $1.3 billion
dollars.2"' Nearly two years later on February 10, 2014, about 60
more works, including several by Renoir and Monet, were
discovered at Gurlitt's home in Salzburg. 2 Cornelius Gurlitt had
sold several of the works prior to the initial raid, including a
Beckmann painting, Lion Tamer, which was sold at a Cologne
auction house in December 201 1.203 Several descendants of
holocaust victims and Jewish art dealers have already come
forward to claim works from the stash, and in May 2015, a Munich
District Court authorized the return of the first two paintings from
the trove to be returned to heirs.2°4
A. History
Hildebrand Gurlitt was an art historian and dealer who, under
the Nazi regime, was appointed as a dealer for the Fuhrermuseum
were not in violation of international law, it also noted that, due to the "host of
anti-Semitic laws passed by Hungary during WWII", the de Csepel family was
no longer considered by the government to be citizens. 714 F.3d at 597. This
important distinction was not ultimately relevant to the case, since the "taking"
at issue was for a bailment breach occurring after WWII, but it could be
important for future act of state cases. Id. In both Stroganoff-Scherbatoffand
Chabad, the court had left unclear whether religious persecution would offend
some "customary international law" under act of state.
200

Phillip Oltermann, Picasso,Matisse and Dix among works found in Munch's

Nazi artstash, THE GUARDIAN (November 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.c
om/artanddesign/2013/nov/05/picasso-matisse-nazi-art-munich.
201

id.

202

Salzburg art stash 'more important than Munich, BBC NEWS (February

14, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26187296.
203
204

Oltermann, supra note 200.
First Two Paintings from Gurlitt trove return to Jewish heirs, JEWISH

WORLD CONGRESS (May 12, 2015), http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/

en/news/first-two-paintings-from-gurlitt-trove-retum-to-jewish-heirs.
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in Linz.20 5 Gurlitt was also one of four dealers appointed by the
Nazi leadership to the Commission for the Exploitation of
Degenerate Art, which marketed confiscated art abroad during
World War II.26 Originally a museum director, Gurlitt had been
fired due to his sales of modem "degenerate" art and his Jewish
heritage. 0 7 However, because of his renown as a dealer and
contacts both inside and outside of Germany, he proved invaluable
to the Nazis in their art thefts and dealings.2 8 In his new role with
the Nazi regime, Gurlitt had access to a wide breadth of
confiscated art, much of which he kept for himself. After the war,
Gurlitt told Americans that his collection had been destroyed in the
1945 firebombing of Dresden.0 9 His Jewish heritage and noted
dislike of Nazi principles convinced the allies to let him go free.21
When he died in a car crash in 1956, Gurlitt's son Cornelius
presumably inherited the works his father had secretly kept.2"'
It is unclear how many of the works found in the stash were
bought by Hildebrand Gurlitt legally, in his profession as an art
dealer, and how many were derived from his trades and dealings in
confiscated art with the Nazis.2 12 Although Cornelius claimed that
his father legally acquired all of the works, experts have strongly
questioned this presumption.21 3 It is estimated that at least 300 of
the works were exhibited at the Degenerate Art Exhibition, held in

205

Hildebrand Gurlitt - der Sachse hinter dem Miinchner Kunstschatz, FREIE

PRESSE (in German) (November 5, 2013), http://www.freiepresse.de
/NACHRICHTEN/TOP-THEMA/Hildebrand-Gurlitt-der-Sachse-hinter-demMuenchner-Kunstschatz-artike18592544.php.
206 Christopher Dickey, The Man Who Hoarded Art for the
Nazis, THE DAILY
BEAST (November 5 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/05/
the-man-who-hoarded-art-for-the-nazis.html.
207 id.

lbn haul of art treasures seized by Nazis found in squalid Munich flat,
DAILY MAIL UK (November 3, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-248625 1/1 bn-haul-art-Picasso-Renoir-Matisse-squalid-Munich-flat.html.
208

209 id.
210
21

212
213

id.
Dickey, supra note 206.
Oltermann, supra note 200.
Nazi-looted art: German collector says he owns pictures, BBC

NEWS

(November 17, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24977814.
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Munich in 1937. 21 4' These "degenerate" works were taken from
German public museums and galleries around the country.2 5
Therefore, one of the essential questions in any suit to return
these works to their original owners will be: were the works
legally bought and sold by Hildebrand Gurlitt? For many of the
works, this may never be known. Other works were likely sold to
Nazi dealers under duress or bribery as a way of escaping
persecution. Still others were summarily taken from museums and
galleries under no legal pretense. The difficulty arises in
determining which of these sales were forced, which were legal
under German law at the time, and which were expropriations.
The primary laws that allowed Hitler and the Nazi party to
"legally" pass much of the 1930s and 40s legislation were the 1933
Reichstag Fire Decree and the Enabling Act.216 The Reichstag Fire
Decree was enacted following the burning of the Reichstag, the
building that housed the German legislative body." 7 The Decree
suspended the civil liberties guaranteed by the Weimar
Constitution and centralized power in Berlin. 18 The Enabling Act
was an amendment to the Weimar Constitution that gave the
German Cabinet, run by Hitler, the power to enact laws without
the involvement of the Reichstag. Following this, Hitler's cabinet
was able to "legally" commence its reign of rule by decree.
B. Application of the Act of State Doctrine
Application of the act of state doctrine depends largely on the
approach any given court choses to take. Although there is clearly
much debate surrounding the correct application (and even
application at all) of the act of state doctrine, most courts defer to
the four-factor test set out in Sabbatino. However, Sabbatino itself
was not clear about whether this four factor standard truly applied,
and named several other "considerations" that a court might take

214

Supra note 208.

215

DAVID CLAY LARGE, Berlin 283 (2000).

216

Id. at 262.

217 Id.
218 id.
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into account. 19 In addition, some courts have incorporated the
exceptions, the "treaty exception" and the Bernstein exception, as
factors to consider when determining whether to apply act of
state.220 Act of state will be an issue for any of the works in the
Gurlitt Collection that were privately owned. This includes works
taken from private individuals, galleries, or collections, or any
works that were taken while on loan to museums.
A large part of the Gurlitt Collection consists of works from the
1937 Degenerate Art Exhibit, which were all taken from public
German museums. These works, because they were publicly
owned by the German state at the time of their removal, are not
subject to restitution claims, unless it can be shown that they were
privately owned. It should therefore be noted that in this
hypothetical act of state assessment, much depends on the specific
facts surrounding the works, as will doubtless become more clear
as the collection is sorted and catalogued. The collection was left
by bequest to the Kunstmuseum Bern, which has pledged openness
in returning works to their rightful owners.2 2 ' Any works found to
be looted are to be returned, at the expense of the German
government, and any works found to have proper title will go to
the museum. It is therefore, hopefully, likely that no court will
need to delve into the act of state doctrine, as there will be no need
to file in court. If, however, this becomes necessary, prevailing act
of state case law and principles will guide.
A court should assess the Gurlitt Collection works should be
assessed against the factors set out in Sabbatino. First is the issue
of whether the expropriations occurred within the foreign nation's
own sovereign territory. Here, many of the works held in the
collection were amassed from inside Germany; from German
museums or private collections located within the country. Were
this found not to be the case, in the situation where it was clear that
a work was taken from an occupied country, the court would have

220

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 443 (1987).
Frankel, supra note 5 at 89.

221

Melissa Eddy, Swiss Museum Accepts Art Trove Amassed Under Nazis,

219

NEW YORK TIMES (November 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/25/arts/design/swiss-museum-kunstmuseum-bem-comelius-gurlittnazi-era- art.html? r=0.
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a similar situation to the Menzel case, and given that precedent, the
expropriation would likely not be protected under act of state. As
research on the collection continues, there is some indication that
many works may have been taken from Poland and France, and
these works would fall into this category. 2
The second and third factors established in Sabbatino are
discussed here concurrently.
They state that the taking must have been by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized at the time of suit.223 The Nazi

government was doubtless a foreign government in the 1930s and
1940s, and Germany is doubtless a foreign government in the
present day. The Nazi government, however, is no longer
recognized by the United States. Obviously, the counter argument
to this is that the Nazi government was, at the time, the German
government, which is currently recognized (and an ally). However,
one could argue that due to the total suspension of the Weimar
Constitution by Hitler and the Nazi party and the complete regime
change after World War II, the Nazi government was really a
separate government that is no longer in existence. This is what the
Sabbatino court recognized when it stated, "The balance of
relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government
which perpetuated the challenged act of state is no longer in
existence, as in the Bernstein case, for the political interest of this
country may, as a result, be measurably altered." Again, in First
City National Bank, the court distinguished Bernstein on the basis
that the taking in Bernstein was perpetrated by a foreign
government no longer in existence. 24 This was a sentiment echoed
in Konowaloff where the court stated that it may be relevant that
the expropriation was carried out by an entirely different regime
where the previous government "has been completely rejected by
the community of nations.., or where the subsequent government
has actively repudiated the acts of the former regime. '"225 Although

222

Annika Zeitler,

Better networking to improve provenance research,

DEUTSCHE WELLE (March 2, 2014), http://www.dw.de/better-networking-to-

improve-provenance-research/a- 17465363.
223 Sabbatino, 367 U.S. at 428.
224 Frankel, supra note 5 at 76.
225 Konowaloff, 2011 WL 4430856, at *6.
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a majority of the court in First City National Bank rejected the
application of the Bernstein exception, it can be argued that this
rejection was limited to the facts of that case, which dealt with
assets expropriated by the Cuban government, and the exception
may be applied to another Nazi-era case for precisely that reason.
The "treaty exception" can also be helpful in the case of the
Gurlitt Collection. Several treaties or conferences that establish
customary international law were in force during World War II.
However, application of the "treaty exception" may be limited, due
to the previously discussed disagreement between the circuits
about its application. Nonetheless, the 1907 Hague Convention
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land was signed by
both the United States and Germany. 2 6 Article 56 provided that
property of municipalities, charities, and arts and sciences
institutions was to be treated as private property.22 7 Further, seizure
of this property was forbidden, and would be subject to
adjudication in court.2 2 The argument to be made here would be
similar to that made in Menzel, which proved part of a winning
argument for plaintiffs.
In addition to the 1907 Hague Convention, other applicable
declarations would lend more weight to the "treaty exception" to
act of state. In 1998, the United States hosted the Washington
Conference, which concluded with the non-binding Washington
Principles.2 29 These called for nations to facilitate the identification
of Nazi looted art and to search for "just and fair" solutions to
repatriation. 3 The establishment of these principles, and their
subsequent reinforcement in the Terezin Declaration of 200921 can
be seen as "an international obligation to provide claimants a
means to seek restitution. '23 2 However, because the Washington
226

Schwallie, supra note 7 at 300.

227 GERSTENBLITH,

supra note 4 at 544.

228 Id.

U.S. State Dep't, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated
Art, in WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA PROCEEDINGS 971,
971-72 (1998), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm.
230 Id.
231 U.S. DEPT. STATE, TEREZIN DECLARATION (June 30, 2009),
available at
229

http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm.
232 Kreder, supra note 57.
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Principles were not binding, it is unclear whether this can be held
to be a controlling legal standard. 23 3 It should be noted that in the

case of the Gurlitt Collection, the President of the Kunstmuseum
Bern's Board of Trustees has stated that the museum would adhere
to the 1998 Washington Conference Principles.3
There are many problems with relying on the Bernstein
exception for cases involving works like the Gurlitt collections.
One is that the State Department, presumably, must issue a letter.
If no letter is issued to the court, there is no indication that it can
sua sponte request one or proceed on the merits as if one had been
issued. This holds true even though the policy expressed in the
original Bernstein letter very likely still applies to subsequent
Holocaust-related cases. Indeed, some courts view the absence of a
Bernstein letter as an implied mandate to apply act of state.23 This
brings up a second issue, which is the confusion as to its
application among the courts, as evidenced in First City National
Bank, W.S. Kirkpatrick, and Riggs National Corp. v. Commission,
and described earlier in this paper."' Even if the State Department:
were to issue a letter, there is no guarantee that it would be
controlling. Many of the same policy considerations that arose in
Bernstein still exist today (religious persecution, change of regime,
strong U.S. policy towards holocaust-era repatriation) and would
seem to warrant acceptance of the letter. However, the Supreme"

233 Bert Demarsin, The Third Time is Not Always a Charm: The Troublesome

Legacy of a Dutch Art Dealer- The limitation and Act of State Defenses in
LootedArt Cases, 28 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 255, 309. (2010).
234 Eddy, supra note 221. However, as to the efficacy of
this pronouncement,
see an analysis of the Washington Principles as they relate to the Gurlitt
Collection (Marc Masurovsky, The Gurlitt indictment: Washington Principles
vs. the German government and its partners, PLUNDERED ART (February 14,
2015), http://plundered-art.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/the-gurlitt-indictment-was
hington.htmi).
235 Frankel, supra note 5 at 90; see Empresa Cubana Exportadora
de Azucar y
Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co, 652
F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1981).
236 See Riggs National Corp. v. Commission, 163 F.3d 1363, 1367 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), ("While not yet endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court, some
justices have suggested an exception to the doctrine for cases in which the
executive branch has represented in a so-called 'Bernstein' letter").
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Court, especially in First City National Bank, has been wary (to
say the least) about whether these considerations should apply.
Another problem with applying the Bernstein exception may be
that United States and German relations have changed
dramatically since 1954. As stated above, there is a good argument
that the Nazi government does not fulfill the "sovereign
government extant and recognized" prong of the Sabbatino test,
but this is not dispositive of current foreign relations with
Germany. At the time Bernstein was decided, the United States
government, as the recent victor of war, may have felt more power
to interfere in German affairs, but this is not currently the case.237
This may especially be true in the case of the Gurlitt Collection
where the German government insists that it is handling
repatriation requests.2 38 The agreement included the cooperation of
a taskforce called "Schwabinger Art Trove" set up specifically to
deal with Gurlitt's collection, as well as the lostart.de database, the
Limbach Commission, and Berlin's Center for Provenance
Research.239 Given Germany's large investment in the case, it
seems clear that adjudication of one of these claims by a United
States court may serve to undermine German efforts and cause
tension. In addition, it would seem better policy to allow
provenance and art history experts, not the court, to carry out
research regarding the history of these works, especially
considering the wealth of information that continues to be
discovered.24 This kind of judicial interference in both foreign
Schwallie, supra note 7 at 303.
On April 7, 2014, Cornelius Gurlitt came to an agreement with the Bavarian
State Ministry and the German Federal Commissioner for Culture and Media to
allow provenance and restitution research to be carried out on the trove of
works. This research continues today, per an agreement betwee the German
government and then Kunstmuseum Bern. Bayerisches Staatsministerium der
Justiz, Joint Press Release 64/2014, "Schwabing Art Trove": Agreement
between the Free State of Bavaira, the Federal Government and Cornelius
Gurlitt:Provenance researchto continue and restitution in accordancewith the
Washington Principles on a voluntary basis for the Schwabing Art Trove;
Unproblematic works belonging to Mr. Gurlitt will be returned, (available at
www.gurlitt.info/files/07-04-2014-EN.pdf).
239 Zeitler, supra note 228.
240 See, eg. Melissa Eddy, Victoria and Albert Museum to Publish Nazi-Era
237

1

'DegenerateArt' Inventory Online, THE NEW YORK TIMES (January 17, 2014),
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relations and matters outside the court's area of expertise area
exactly what the act of state doctrine seeks to avoid.24 '
V. CONCLUSION

Although the act of state doctrine has a long history in United
States jurisprudence, there is debate over whether the doctrine is
even good policy given that so many transactions in our modem
world are international and involve some act by a foreign
government. Some courts agree with this assessment and argue
that the power of the judiciary to adjudicate claims should be
sovereign and not bound by executive pronouncements.242 The
Court in Dunhill saw the doctrine as unnecessary stating, "Thus, it
is our view that if the Court should decide to overrule the holding.
in Sabbatino so that acts of state would thereafter be subject to.
adjudication in American courts under international law, we would
not anticipate embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign policy
of the United States. 2 43
There is also a strong and longstanding United States policy
aimed at redressing Holocaust-era claims, from the Bernstein letter
to the Washington Conference and the Holocaust Victim Redress
Act. 4 To some scholars, these agreements "demonstrate that there
is a clear agreement on applicable law for situations of Naziartsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01 / 17/victoria-and-albert-museum-to-publishnazi-era-degenerate-art-inventory-online/. This is now available at: http://www.
vam.ac.uk/content/articles/e/entartete-kunst/.
241 As an example of foreign retaliations and tensions due to the application of
act of state, see the Russian government's reaction to the Agudas Chasidei
Chabad case ("In an earlier reaction to the dispute over the collection, which
has now lasted decades, it forbade its state-run museums, including the
Hermitage in St. Petersburg and the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow,
to lend works to American museums"). David M. Herszenhorn, Russian Warns
of Retaliation Over U.S. Ruling on a Jewish Collection, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(January 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/1 8/world/europe/russiawarns-of-retaliation-over-us-ruling- on-jewish-collection.html.
242 See First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 790-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243 A lfredDunhillof London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 710-11.
244 Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. Law 105-158, February 13,1998,
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW- 105publ 158/pdf/
PLAW-105publ 158.pdf.
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appropriated art. ... [and] the judiciary should feel comfortable
examining the validity of Nazi takings in claims for the restitution
of art without hindrance by the act of state doctrine.""'45 To others,
the issue is more cut and dry: "the act of state doctrine, however,
does not apply to the Nazi regime because it was a criminal
organization." ' 6 Until a clear pronouncement from the Supreme
Court about the place of act of state in our modem world, or
legislative action to cure this ambiguity, international repatriation
claims will be plagued with uncertainty.2 4 7

Schwallie, supra note 7 at 305.
Kreder, supra note 57 at 320.
247 The Court most recently had a chance to address act of
state with Von Saher
v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 754 F.3d 712 ( 9 th Cir. 2014), but denied
245

246

certiorari.
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